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Crisis of Democracy or Creative Reform?
Dutch Debates on the Repression 
of Parliamentary Representatives 
and Political Parties, 1933-1940
Joris G ijsen b e rg h
One of the most studied crises of democracy occurred in the two 
decades following the First World War. The phrase “crisis of democra­
cy” was coined in the interwar period, but has been used most by schol­
ars who have come on the scene since 1945; they eagerly adopted the 
phrase because to them it symbolized the demise of the democratic 
principle in the 1920s and 1930s. After all, they argued, many democra­
cies were replaced by dictatorships, aid  even in countries where the 
democratic system survived it was fiercely criticized That view of the 
dark fate of democracy in the interwar period has been aptly summa­
rized by historian Mark Mazower: “Triumphant in 1918, it [democracy] 
was virtually extinct twenty years on.”1
Although that general argument is sound, a number of recent studies 
have rightly claimed that the “crisis of democracy” thesis tends to 
ignore two important characteristics of interwar debates on democracy: 
the pluriformity of the critique and the contested nature of the concept 
of “democracy”. Therefore, this essay argues, it might be time to focus
Mazower, Mark, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, London, Alien Lane, 
1998, p. 3. Other scholars sharing this view and focusing on the failure of democracy 
in the 1920s and 1930s include Eschcnburg, Theodor, “The Breakdown of Democrat­
ic Systems Between the Two World Wars”, in id., The Path to Dictatorship, 1918­
1933, New York, Garden City, 1966, pp. 1-18; Newman, Karl J., European Democ­
racy Between the Wars, London, Allen & Unwin, 1970; Linz, Tuan José and Stepan, 
Alfred C. (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978; Stem, Fritz, “The New Democracies in Crisis in 
Interwar Europe”, in Axel Hadenius (ed.), Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Cam­
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 15-23; Bessel, Richard, “The Crisis of 
Modem Democracy, 1919-1945”, in David Potter et al. (eds.), Democratization, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, pp. 71-94; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Mitchell, Jeremy 
(eds.), Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 
2000; and Capoccia, Giovanni, Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in 
Interwar Europe, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, p. 6.
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on those two overlooked aspects and to reconsider the appreciation of 
democracy in those dynamic decades.2
First, the points of criticism that were aimed against the democratic 
system in the interwar years differed and sometimes even contradicted 
each other. That has been recognized by many authors, but has mainly 
strengthened the traditional conclusion that democracy was under attack 
from all sides.3 However, as more and more scholars have recently 
stressed, it could also be argued that there was no consensus among the 
critics of democracy,4 which suggests that there was no single, uniform 
crisis of democracy.
Second, and more importantly, democracy is an essentially contested 
concept, meaning different things to different people and changing in 
meaning over time. During the interwar period not only was the demo­
cratic ideal contested, the concrete form that democracy should take was 
also under dispute. Many critics did not wait to abolish democratic rule, 
but instead tried to reform it radically. Their attempts led, in the words 
of historians Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, to “many contesting
In 2002, the European History Quarterly dedicated a themed issue to a new, less 
straightforward perspective on democracy. Its authors urged historians to “demon­
strate that democracy is not a single model but a political practice in a state of con­
tinual evolution”. Buchanan, Tom C. and Conway, Martin, “The Politics of Democ­
racy in Twentieth Century Europe: Introduction”, European History Quarterly, 
Vol. 32, No. 1, 2002, pp. 7-12, here p. 12. In the Netherlands, a national research 
programme was begun in 2006 to focus on the contested nature of the concept of 
“democracy”,
Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 20-25; De Rooy, Piet, “Een zoekende tijd. De 
ongemakkelijke democratie, 1913-1949”, in Remieg Aerts etal. (eds.), Land var. 
kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland, 1780-1990, Nijmegen. 
SUN, 1999, pp. 179-262, here p. 229; Luyten, Dirk and Magnette, Paul, “Het parle­
mentarisme in België”, in Emmanuel Gerard et al. (eds.), Geschiedenis van de Bel­
gische Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers, 1830-2002, Brussels, Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2003, pp. 19-48; and Koole, Rudolf A., “Le culte de l’in­
compétence. Antipolitiek, populisme en de kritiek op het Nederlandse parlementaire 
stelsel”, in Carla van Baaien et al. (eds.), In tijden van crisis. Jaarboek Parlemen­
taire Geschiedenis 2009, Amsterdam, Boom, 2009, pp. 47-57.
Dunk, Hermann W. von der, “De partijen en de parlementaire democratie in het 
interbellum”, Jaarboek Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, 1983. 
pp. 41-61, here pp. 56-57; Witte, Els etal., “De Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordi­
gers (1830-2002)”, in Gerard et al., Geschiedenis van de Belgische Kamer van volks­
vertegenwoordigers, pp. 385-406, here pp. 403-405; Gerard, E m m an u el,‘“Een 
schadelijke instelling.’ Kritiek op het parlement in België in het interbellum”, Bij­
dragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, Vol. 120, 
2005, pp. 497-512, here pp. 497-498, 505-508; and Aerts, Remieg, Het aanzien van 
de politiek Geschiedenis van een functionele fictie, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2009, 
pp. 15-16, 26-28.
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definitions of democracy”.5 What one commentator considered to be an 
jjnprovement of democracy could seem to be democracy’s ruin to 
another. As a result, it is virtually impossible to make a clear distinction 
between anti-democrats and defenders of democracy. There was an 
important middle ground, which has nevertheless been ignored by many 
previous scholars.6
An example from the 1930s might serve to illustrate the tension be­
tween conceptions of democracy. After he had fled Nazi Germany in 
1933, the German philosopher and political scientist Karl Loewenstein 
advocated the repression of anti-democrats. In his view, European 
democracies should b e  saved by turning “liberal democracy” into 
“disciplined democracy”. In 1938 he rejoiced:
Democracy, fighting fire with fire, begins to become militant. Liberal de­
mocracy, style 1900, slowly gives way to “disciplined” or even “authoritari­
an” democracy of the postwar depression pattern. Critics of such trends may 
contend that the cure for which it is intended to serve, may easily become a 
disease which ultimately will destroy what is essential in democratic values. 
Such objectors are evidently under the delusion that democracy is a station­
ary and unchangeable form of government.7
The quotation shows that conceptions of democracy can differ radi­
cally. Liberal democracy or parliamentary democracy, as it was also 
often styled, was based on the ideals of freedom and die sovereignty of 
the people. Its laws and institutions guaranteed citizens independence 
from the state and influence over their own government. Corresponding­
ly, an independent and critical parliament was the most central demo­
cratic element.8 Disciplined democracy, on the other hand, curtailed
Buchanan and Conway, “Politics o f Democracy”, pp. 7, 10. See also Gerard, ‘“Een 
schadelijke instelling’”, pp. 503-504.
6 The political scientist Capoccia is a recent example o f the tenacious scholarly 
tendency to create a dichotomy between opponents and advocates of democracy and 
to ignore attempts to redefine it. Although Capoccia admits that “democracy” is a 
contested concept, he regards that as a potential obstacle to comparative research in­
stead of as an interesting new perspective. He tries to circumvent the difficulty by 
arguing (unconvincingly) that in interwar Europe the meaning of “democracy” was 
much more clearly defined than in the following decades: “From the point of view of 
the political actors involved, the distinction between the two fronts, democratic and 
antidemocratic, even discounting the newness of the challenges and all of the ambi­
guities that characterized party politics, was certainly clearer than it is now. As a 
consequence, the stake of the struggle between democrats and those holding anti­
democratic beliefs, namely the persistence of democratic institutions, was relatively
_ clear as well.” Capoccia, Defending Democracy, p. 235.
Loewenstein, Karl, “Legislative Control o f Political Extremism in European Democ­
racies. Part II”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 38, 1938, pp. 725-774, here p. 774. 
Bonger, Willem A., Problemen der demokratie. Een sociologische enpsychoiogische 
studie, Groningen, Noordhoff, 1934, p. 17.
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citizens’ liberties by enforcing a sense of responsibility for an orderly 
society and by adopting -  in the words of Loewenstein -  “restraining 
and preventive methods in government and constitutional law, and 
legislation against political extremism”.9 The emphasis on self-restraint 
diminished the ability of parliamentarians and citizens to criticize and 
influence government decision-making. A Dutch politician warned 
voters in 1933: “Citizens too, have a duty. Universal suffrage falsely 
suggests that everyone has the right to judge for himself.”10 Neverthe­
less, disciplined democracy regarded the translation of the people’s will 
into policy as its main goal, provided that its inhabitants respected the 
national interest. In that respect, it differed from a third “repertoire of 
democracy”11 in the 1930s, which was ignored by Loewenstein. “Essen­
tial democracy” was a moral principle instead of a practical voting 
arrangement, and its key components were liberty and equality, which 
were deemed even more important than the representation of the people. 
Because those values had to be defended at all costs, essential democra­
cy contained repressive measures against anti-democrats, but respected 
the liberties of all supporters of democracy.12 Those three conceptions of 
democracy clashed with each other during the interwar period, as will 
become clear in this essay. The quotation from Loewenstein shows that 
the nature of democracy was fiercely debated, and while Loewenstein 
regarded himself as a defender and reformer of democracy, his oppo­
nents accused him of dismantling the democratic system. Again it 
becomes clear that a dividing line between anti-democrats aid demo­
crats cannot be drawn easily.
Focusing on the two neglected elements of democratic debate in the 
interwar period seriously undermines the traditional view of the “crisis 
of democracy”. This term usually denotes the principal rejection and 
demise of democracy, but that characterization of the interwar political 
climate is incomplete. In addition to anti-democratic attacks and the 
threat of its own collapse, democracy faced a struggle on many fronts 
for its definition; or redefinition. It would be too drastic to discard the 
expression “crisis of democracy” altogether, but its meaning should be 
extended. The term should encompass both the possible downfall and
Loewenstein, “Legislative Control. Part II”, p. 774. See also Loewenstein, Karl, 
“Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies. Part I”, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 38,1938, pp. 591-622, here p. 622.
10 Goseling, C.M.J.F., Gezonde voIJainvloed en sterk overheidsgezag. Staathmdige 
democratie, The Hague, R.K. Staatspartij, 1933, pp. 8-9.
11 A repertoire of democracy is a certain form of a democratic system, which is based 
on a specific ideological foundation and consists of a set of institutions, measures, 
symbols, and ideas.
12 Josephus Jitta, Abraham C., Het wezen der democratie, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1938.
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the creative renewal of the democratic system. After all, the word 
“crisis” can refer to a critical stage in which changes in either direction 
are imminent, as has been stressed in the introduction to this volume. 
Since “democracy” is a complicated concept, the “crisis of democracy” 
of the 1920s and 1930s was more complicated and had more facets than 
has often been suggested.
In order to illustrate the point, this essay will concentrate on Dutch 
discussions between 1933 and 1940 about the repression of extremist 
parliamentary representatives and political parties. A close examination 
of a few specific debates will shed light on both the appreciation of the 
ideal of democracy and the confrontation between rivalling repertoires 
of democratic elements. Like many other parliamentary democracies, 
the Netherlands was confronted with politicians of the extreme left and 
the extreme right who sat in the legislative assemblies and wanted to 
abolish parliamentary rule, sometimes even styling themselves “true 
democrats” in the process. In response, the Dutch government and 
parliament considered reforming their democracy in order to curb the 
so-called “revolutionaries”. The subsequent debates over reform reveal 
the views on the character and limits of democracy.
First of all, the discussions showed how Dutch politicians them­
selves perceived the “crisis of democracy” and make clear whether they 
felt that democracy was worth fighting for. Therefore, the first question 
which will be answered in the following analysis is whether the Dutch 
measures were meant to save democracy. Even in a time of “crisis of 
democracy”, the democratic system still had its supporters, but, on the 
other hand, fighting extremism was not necessarily the same as protect­
ing democracy.13 The repressive measures proposed might also have 
been meant to protect law and order from radical politics. After all, 
communists, fascists and national socialists not only attacked parliamen­
tary democracy, but also posed a threat to other aspects of bourgeois 
liberal society.
Second, the debate about the suppression of extremism shows what 
the prevailing definitions of democracy were and where the boundaries 
of democracy were drawn. It becomes clear not only which persons and 
parties were excluded from the democratic system, it also brings to the 
surface clashes between different conceptions of democracy. In order to 
curb political extremism and correct “the flaws of democracy”, some 
politicians suggested stretching democracy’s limits by adding repressive 
measures to curtail democratic rights. That idea aroused considerable 
debate, because other commentators abhorred the thought of changes to
QuchaDan, Tom C., “Anti-Fascism and Democracy in the 1930s”, European History 
Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2002, pp. 39-57, here p. 39.
13
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the existing democracy, sensing that repressive measures would destroy 
the whole democratic system. That leads us to the second question 
which will be posed here: were the anti-extremist measures deemed 
democratic or undemocratic by Dutch politicians? Put differently, which 
conflicting definitions of democracy can be identified?
This case study explores a side of the interwar debates on democracy 
that has received scant scholarly attention. At first glance, Dutch histo­
riography seems to have escaped some of the flaws of the traditional 
literature on the interwar “crisis of democracy”. Following Anthonius 
A. de Jonge, most authors have made a distinction between a “major 
crisis of democracy” (fundamental anti-democratic critique) and a 
“minor crisis of democracy” (democratic doubts about the adequacy of 
the parliamentary system).14 In doing so, they at least show that the 
crisis of democracy was pluriform. However, de Jonge’s rigid, norma­
tive distinction also has an important drawback, for it is based on a 
narrow, ahistorical definition of parliamentary democracy and leaves no 
room for a “grey area” between major and minor crises where people 
sought alternative forms of democracy, instead of alternatives to it. 
Therefore, it is time to discard the black-and-white view and rather to 
analyse the intricacy of Dutch attitudes to democracy in the 1930s.15
Parliamentary Democracy under Pressure
Compared with other polities, such as Italy, Germany, and Portugal, 
Dutch democracy seemed to fare relatively well in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The process of democratization, which had started in the nineteenth 
century and consisted of broadening the suffrage, successfully ended in 
1917 and 1919, when all male and female citizens respectively received 
the right to vote. The large majority of those voters faithfully supported 
the established parties, which meant that communists, fascists, and na­
tional socialists could not obtain more than a tiny fraction of the seats in 
parliament. As a result, the parliamentary system could survive relative­
ly unscathed until the German invasion in May 1940.
14 Jonge, Anthonius A. de, Crisis en critiek der democratie. Anti-democratische 
stromingen en de daarin levende denkbeelden over de staat in Nederland tussen de 
wereldoorlogen, Assen, van Gorcum, 1968, p. 6. This work has dominated views on 
the Dutch “crisis of democracy” in the interwar period for decades.
15 Dunk, “De partijen”; and Vossen, Koen P.S.S., Vrij vissen in het Vondelpark Kleine 
politieke partijen in Nederland 1918-1940, Amsterdam, Wereldbibliotheek, 2003. 
These authors, among others, have argued that de Jonge’s dichotomy is too rigid, but 
they have not yet provided a thorough analysis o f the contesting Dutch definitions of 
democracy.
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Nevertheless, Dutch politicians and other commentators frequently 
discussed the “crisis of democracy”.16 They used this phrase to refer 
both to the fall of foreign democracies and to the domestic situation. 
Despite outward appearances, Dutch parliamentary democracy endured 
considerable strain, as parliamentarians and the parliamentary institution 
were the targets of criticism from many sides, which led to grave uncer­
tainty about the future of the political system.
Shortly after the adoption of universal suffrage, a perceived lack of 
eminent statesmen aroused concern. Some commentators felt that 
parliament was increasingly occupied by mediocre representatives of 
single-issue groups. Many others blamed the established political parties 
which seemed to have gained more power. Despite this difference in 
alleged causes, commentators all feared that parliamentarians were 
unable to fulfil their noble task: defending the national interest. At the 
end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, complaints about the 
lack of wise politicians evolved into a call for strong leaders. According 
to some, the representation of the people’s will had become less im­
portant than the execution of effective policy. That was a view propa­
gated by right-wing extremists, but it also attracted conservative liberal 
and confessional politicians. Many of them had never been thrilled with 
universal suffrage and “the rule of the ignorant masses”, and were 
worried about declining national unity. At die other end of the political 
spectrum, communists accused professional politicians of corruption 
and the suppression of the working people.17
In addition to representatives being criticized, parliament itself re­
ceived criticism. Critics especially targeted its inefficient and slow 
procedures, and once again the commentators can be divided into 
different groups. Some of them lamented the loss of parliamentary 
power because of the institution’s inability to take measures into its own 
hands. They also regretted the waning confidence of the people in their 
representatives. Other critics feared that their inefficient parliament 
hindered the government in the implementation of its policy. Another 
dreaded result of parliamentary inefficiency, according to many politi­
Bongcr, Problemen der demokratie, p. 85, and Snethlage, Jacob Leonard, Democra­
tie en dictatuur, Arnhem, van Loghuin Slaterus, 1933. An advertisement in the latter 
book even suggests that the “crisis of democracy” was a very popular theme among 
people who were interested in social and political issues.
Bos, Anne, Loots, Jasper and Jong, Ron de, Een sprong in het duister: de overgang 
van het absolute meerderheidsstelsel naar het stelsel van evenredige vertegen­
woordiging in 1918. Een onderzoek naar de beweegredenen voor de invoering van 
de evenredige vertegenwoordiging, de effecten op de verkiezingscampagnes en de 
discussies over verdere hervormingen na 1918, The Hague, Nijhofï, 2005, pp. 46, 
49-57; and Vossen, Vrij vissen in het Vondelpark, pp. 140,202.
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cians, was that law and order might not be upheld. Parliament even 
seemed unable to restore order within its own ranks, as long as extremist 
parliamentarians damaged the dignity of the legislative assembly with 
their uncivilized political style and attacks on the political system.18
In short, Dutch public debate in the interwar period was character­
ized by a plethora of different and contrasting practical and ideological 
objections to parliamentary democracy. There was no consensus on 
what was wrong with the existing political system, and the only thing 
the commentators agreed upon was the need for change. Attempts to 
reorganize and reform parliamentary democracy in the 1930s, however, 
would lead only to more disagreements aid  discussions.
Law, Order, and Parliamentary Dignity
At the beginning of the 1930s, the Dutch authorities grew increas­
ingly anxious about the economic crisis and its unsettling influences on 
society. They feared that citizens would be attracted to extremist move­
ments and would be prone to violent and unruly behaviour. In 1934, the 
head of the intelligence service warned police chiefs about “the increas­
ing dissatisfaction and despondency, which is apparent in large parts of 
the populace and which will continue to grow”.19 Since the previous 
year especially, such fears seemed to be justified. Sailors on a naval 
vessel had mutinied, many workers had gone on strike, extremist organ­
izations had held frequent demonstrations, and radical parties had won 
some votes in parliamentary elections at the expense of mainstream 
parties. Moreover, membership of the new Nationaal-Socialistische 
Beweging (NSB) increased rapidly. Although the Dutch national­
socialist organization had not participated in the elections and at first 
seemed more civilized than the dreaded communists, its growth in­
creased the establishment’s worries, especially after Hitler had come to 
power in Germany.20
In response, the third confessional cabinet of Charles Ruijs de 
Beerenbrouck and its successor, Hendrik Colijn’s second, confessional- 
liberal cabinet took many anti-extremist measures in 1933 and 1934
18 Aerts, Het aanzien van de politiek, pp. 27-28; and Koole, “Le culte de rincompé- 
tence”, pp. 48-50.
19 . . .The remarks are contained in the minutes o f a meeting between die intelligence 
service and police chiefs held on 23 November 1934. See Rapportage van de Cen­
trale Inlichtingendienst, 1919-1940, document 15449a, p. 2, http://www.mghist.nl/ 
Onderzoek/Projecten/RapportenCentraleMichtmgendienstl919-1940.
Blom, Johannes C.H., Muiterij op de Zeven Provinciën: reacties en gevolgen in 
Nederland, Bussum, Fibula-van Dishoeck, 1975, pp. 9, 27, 154-155; Vossen, Vrij 
vissen in het Vondelpark, pp. 173-174.
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which were intended to help maintain law and order. Examples included 
a ban on civil servants joining radical organizations, a watchful eye 
being placed on demonstrations, and a stricter law against agitation and 
slander.21 While the government prepared those steps, the parliamentary 
leaders of the liberal (LSP and VDB), Protestant (ARP and CHU), and 
Catholic (RKSP) coalition parties22 decided that parliament had to take 
action too. They suggested tightening the rules regarding parliamentary 
speeches, by expanding the grounds on which the chairman of the lower 
house could force representatives to amend their statements and choose 
more acceptable expressions. Speeches considered subversive or insult­
ing to the Crown, government, or parliament would be prohibited, 
erased from the parliamentary record, and could even lead to the tempo­
rary exclusion from the assembly of the speaker concerned.23
The aim of the suggestion was twofold. First, it was intended to pre­
vent parliamentarians from causing agitation by exploiting their free­
dom from prosecution for statements made while in office. Such abuse 
of their legal immunities was deemed unacceptable, especially once the 
government began demanding a more compliant attitude of its citizens. 
Second, the measure was intended to protect parliamentary dignity by 
prohibiting unsuitable vocabulary. In other words, its purpose was to 
uphold the rule of law and to protect democracy against its enemies and 
its own “flaws”.24 The large majority of parliamentarians used both 
arguments in support of the suggestion. Even the social democratic 
SDAP, which was distrusted by the establishment early in the 1930s and 
which was hard-hit by the repressive measures, agreed to “prevent the 
destruction of parliamentary democracy by the abuse of parliamentary 
rights”.25
Because almost every party desired stricter parliamentary rules, the 
suggestion did not lead to a fundamental debate on the limits of democ­
racy. That topic was broached only by left-wing extremists angry about 
the loss of their “democratic rights and liberties” to criticize the gov-
' Blom, Muiterij op de Zeven Provinciën, pp. 126-132.
The full names of the parties were Liberale Staatspartij “De Vrijheidsbond” (LSP, 
conservative liberal), Vrijzmnig-Detnocratische Bond (VDB, progressive liberal), 
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP, Protestant), Christelijk-Historische Unie (CHU, 
Protestant), and Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP, Catholic).
23 4
Bootsma, Peter and Hoetink, Carla, Over lijken. Ontoelaatbaar taalgebruik in de 
Tweede Kamer, Amsterdam, Boom, 2006, p, 24.
24
Handelingen Tweede Kamer (hereafter, HTK) 1933-1934, bijlage 231, No. 3, p. 2. 
HTK 1933-1934, p. 1124. The full name of the social democratic party was the 
Sociaal-Detnocratischc Arbeiderspartij (SDAP).
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eminent freely.26 Although they rejected parliamentary democracy as a 
matter of principle and strove for a “proletarian democracy”, communist 
Mid radical socialist parliamentarians called the measure a step towards 
“the demolition of democracy”.27 Their accusation was virtually ignored 
by the rest of parliament and even ridiculed by Dolf Joekes (VDB), a 
progressive liberal representative who called the left-wing extremists 
the real enemies of democracy. Clearly, complaints made by a small 
minority of revolutionaries were not taken seriously.
Despite MPs refusal to talk at length about the democratic nature of 
the new parliamentary regulations, their debate sheds some light on the 
way the majority of parliament looked at democracy. The supporters of 
the measure who quickly dismissed the extremists’ objections argued 
that the stricter rules did not curtail the liberties of parliamentarians. 
Instead they consolidated an existing informal parliamentary code, 
which had been binding all along. As a result, it was argued, the meas­
ure did not threaten the democratic system.28 It can be deduced that, to 
most parliamentarians, democracy was based on freedom and on a 
dignified attitude among representatives. Parliament, they believed, 
should adopt an autonomous and critical stance towards the govern­
ment, but should do so with respect. That view of the parliamentary 
system already existed in the nineteenth century, but it was felt that the 
aspect of respect needed more emphasis now that parliament had to deal 
with radical representatives intent on ignoring decorum.29 As a result, 
stringent parliamentary rules were seen as an important aid  justifiable 
addition to the existing repertoire of parliamentary democracy.
Permanent Exclusion of “Revolutionary Representatives”
Two days before parliament adopted its internal code of ethics, in 
February 1934, the minister of justice Josef van Schaik installed an 
advisory committee which was tasked to prepare the next step in the 
repression of the so-called revolutionary representatives. This Koolen 
Committee studied the possibility of permanently excluding from 
national and local legislative bodies representatives who endeavoured to 
change the political system by using or encouraging illegal means. The
Crisis o f  Democracy or Democratic Reform?
26 HTK 1933-1934, pp. 1217, 1227. This stance was taken by the Communistische 
Partij Holland (CPH) and the Revolutionair Socialistische Arbeiderspartij (RSAP).
27 HTK 1933-1934, p. 1221.
28 HTK 1933-1934, pp. 1223-1224.
29 Velde, Henk te, “Spelers en spelbrekers. De beschaving van de Tweede Kamer”, De 
Negentiende Eeuw, Vol. 30,2006, pp. 35-47, here p. 36; and Tanja, Erie, Goede poli­
tiek. De parlementaire cultuur van de Tweede Kamer 1866-1940, Amsterda- 
Boom, 2010, ch. 6.
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prime minister Hendrik Colijn appointed Dyonisius A.P.N. Koolen and 
six legal experts at the request of the same liberal and confessional 
parties that had pleaded for stricter parliamentary rules. Those parties 
felt that more had to be done to nip extremism in the bud. In their eyes, 
prohibiting an insulting or inflammatory speech, erasing the speech 
om the parliamentary record, and even temporarily excluding the 
speaker from the assembly would not deter radical representatives from 
uttering revolutionary rhetoric.30
The desire to take new measures to discourage and punish political 
extremism suggests that the permanent exclusion of “revolutionary 
representatives” was intended to save democracy, as was the increase in 
the chairman’s disciplinary powers. Indeed, most authors argue that 
protection of democracy was the main goal of the measure,31 and that 
seems to be corroborated by the statements of some of its advocates. For 
example, the first parliamentarian to suggest that course of action, the 
conservative liberal Hendrik J. Knottenbelt (LSP), explicitly wanted to 
preserve the “prestige and efficiency of the representative assemblies”,32 
and during the election campaign of 1933 the leader of the Protestant 
ARP, Hendrik Colijn, stressed the need to protect the ailing parliamen­
tary democracy by drastically reforming it. After warning that the 
parliamentary system was in danger of collapsing under its “own flaws” 
and its enemies, he claimed: “There is only one way to prevent this from 
happening. And that is the proper implementation of constitutional- 
parliamentary relations. A government that really governs. A parliament 
that pleads for the people’s interests and that monitors, but does not take 
the place of, the government.”33
And yet, a closer look shows that stricter repression was also often 
motivated by the desire to restore law and order. To some, that was an 
even more important argument than the defence of democracy. Many 
supporters of repressive measures regarded the rule of law as more than 
an aspect of democracy, considering it to be an ideal in itself which they 
valued even more than the democratic system. Colijn, for example, 
explained in his electoral speech that he opposed advocates of dictator­
ship and revolution because otherwise “either the people’s liberties will
The request was made by the LSP, VDB, ARP, CHU, and RKSP. Eskes, Johannes 
A.O., Repressie van politieke bewegingen in Nederland. Een juridisch-historische 
studie over het Nederlandse publiekrechtelijke verenigingsrecht gedurende het 
tijdvak 1798-1988, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1988, pp, 148-155.
Eskes, Repressie, p. 153; and Bootsma and Hoetink, Over lijken, pp. 22-23.
’2 HTK 1933-1934, bijlage. A, I. 3, p. 25.
Colijn, Hendrikus, “Wankelen noch weifelen”, in Geen vergeefs woord. Verzamelde 
deputatenredevoeringen, Kampen, Kok, 1951, pp. 308-321, here pp. 318-319. This is 
the text of an electoral speech given on 9 March 1933.
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be sacrificed to order, or -  which would be even worse -  order and free­
dom will succumb to chaos”.34 Once Colijn had become prime minister 
he made clear that “the government cannot repress any party solely 
because it pursues another form of government than we have now; it can 
act only when an organization disrupts the peace, wishes to attack the 
current form of government with illegal means, or assaults the authori­
ties”.35 That implies that the cabinet did not consider democracy to be 
unassailable and accepted criticism of the democratic system as long as 
the rule of law was respected, Colijn’s defence of democracy was 
probably a means to achieve an orderly society. His support for repres­
sive measures against extremist representatives was based more on the 
urge to maintain order than on the wish to protect democracy. The same 
ambiguous argument was used by the Koolen Committee. One of the 
reasons it mentioned taking action against radical representatives was 
the damage they might inflict on the stature of the representative institu­
tions. However, the committee called that a “secondary danger”. The 
argument it used most frequently was the need to uphold the legal 
order.36 All in all, protection of democracy was often seen as a means to 
an end or as an added advantage, instead of as the main goal of the 
repression of “revolutionary representatives”.
After four months of deliberation, the Koolen Committee concluded 
that “persons who do not belong in representative assemblies should be 
actively barred from them”.37 Exclusion should not be based on the 
ideology of the party involved, but on the question whether the individ­
ual politician had used or propagated illegal action to realize his politi­
cal ideals. Therefore, the committee argued that a representative who
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34 Colijn, “Wankelen noch weifelen”, p. 315. Two weeks earlier, on 21 February 1933, 
Colijn had been even more explicit in his appreciation of law and order: “It is no! 
inconceivable that order will have to be maintained at the expense of freedom, be­
cause it would be worse if order and freedom should both perish”. Cited in Van 
Kaam, Ben, Parade der mannenbroeders. Flitsen uit het protestantse leven in de jar­
en 1938-1938, Wageningen, Zomer & Keuning, 1964. Colijn’s biographer. 
Herman Langcveld, suggests that the Protestant leader cared more for an orderly, 
disciplined society than for parliamentary democracy. According to Langeveld, tb® 
only reason why Colijn had defended this political system in March was to dispel 
fears that he sympathized with fascism. Langeveld, Herman, Schipper naast God 
Hendrikus Colijn, 1869-1944. Deel 2, 1933-1944, Amsterdam, Balans, 2004, pp. 32­
35.
35 H TK1933-1934, p. 288.
36 Koolen, D.A.P.N., Verslag van de staatscommissie, ingesteld bij Koninklijk Besluh 
van 12 februari 1934, nr. 62 (Lidmaatschap van de vertegenwoordigende lichamen} 
The Hague, 1934, pp. 19-21. The report of the Koolen Committee was published o-
16 June 1934.
37 Minutes of the meetings of the Koolen Committee, 31 March 1934, p. 2, Nation:’' 
Archief (hereafter, NA), ArchiefVan Schaik 2.21.151, inv. No. 66.
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conducted or verbally supported unlawful behaviour should permanent­
ly lose his membership of the legislative assembly. Furthermore, certain 
violations o f  the law by representatives, whether inside or outside the 
legislative organs, should automatically lead to the loss of suffrage.38
Both the committee and Colijn’s cabinet realized that those recom­
mendations might be controversial, particularly because punishing those 
who encouraged illegal deeds or expressed the wish to perform them 
was not as straightforward as it might have seemed. In the interwar 
period many political groups peacefully propagated a radical break with 
the existing society and type of regime, so it could not easily be deter­
mined whether such action was illegal. It could be labelled ‘potentially 
illegal”, but that would not be an objective, clear-cut option, as commit­
tee member Jan Donner remarked.39 The government, too, called the 
exclusion of representatives a “very delicate subject”, since it could 
affect “one of the most important civic rights, full suffrage, as well as 
the character of the representative bodies and the position of its mem­
bers”.40
Therefore, the Koolen Committee felt the need to state unambigu­
ously that its advice was not undemocratic. Its report read: “it is not the 
intention to hinder the normal workings of our parliamentary constitu­
tional system nor to force the development of our public institutions in 
an unnatural direction.”41 That is very illuminating, not only because it 
sheds light on the committee’s view of the essence of democracy, but 
also because it shows that the committee’s members expected that 
others might not share their perspective. They apparently took their 
potential opponents seriously, otherwise they would not have taken the 
trouble to try to convince them.
The committee’s report implicitly acknowledged that its suggestions 
might be regarded as dangers to the parliamentary system, as they 
seemed to curtail freedom of speech and to diminish “the prerogative of 
the representative body to inspect critically all aspects of government 
policy”. Nevertheless, the report insisted that that impression was wrong 
and that repression of “revolutionary representatives” was indeed 
democratic.42 The committee members justified their assertion by rede­
fining the concept of “popular representation”. During their meetings, 
they admitted that the exclusion of representatives would be a violation 
of fundamental democratic rights, if  one adhered to the traditional view
IS
Kooien, Verslag van de staatscommissie, pp. 13-18,21-22.
Minutes o f the meetings of the Koolen Committee, 17 March 1934, pp. 4-5.
10 HTK1933-1934, bijlage A, I. 4, p. 32.
Koolen, Verslag van de staatscommissie, p. 22.
Koolen, Verslag van de staatscommissie, pp. 7, 22.
249
Crisis o f  Democracy or Democratic Reform?
that parliament was “an institution that must completely reflect existing 
political opinions”. However, they discarded that definition and instead 
argued that legislative bodies had a responsibility to “pursue the nation­
al interest on the basis of the existing legal order”. Politicians who 
refused to do so did not deserve the right to sit in parliament and criti­
cize the government. As a result, democracy was entitled to repress 
representatives who attacked the political system by illegal means.43 In 
order to avoid “political decisions”, the decision to exclude representa­
tives should be taken not by the government but by mi objective judici-
44ary.
From that line of argument, it can be gleaned that the Koolen Com­
mittee shifted slightly the traditional boundaries of democracy. To some 
extent, it stuck to parliamentary democracy, which was based on free­
dom of speech, made the government accountable to parliament, and 
valued the trias politico. But the committee’s repertoire of democracy 
also contained a responsible representative body and repressive mea­
sures against politicians who lacked self-restraint. This interpretation of 
democracy closely resembled Loewenstein’s disciplined democracy.
The advice of Koolen and his collaborators was not codified in law, 
because Colijn’s cabinet felt that such far-reaching steps would require 
a reform of the constitution. That does not imply that the government 
disagreed with the committee’s proposals, nor its view on democracy, as 
the legal historian Johannes Eskes suggested in 1988.45 On the contrary, 
several Protestant and Catholic ministers had defended a similar concep­
tion of democracy, even when they remarked that the exclusion of 
representatives was controversial. When van Schaik installed the Kool­
en Committee, for example, he stated:
The government that recognizes its responsibility does not fear criticism of 
its policy by the representatives of the people, even if it can sometimes be 
sharp, [...] But if that criticism degenerates into serving revolutionary goals 
or using revolutionary methods, it is destructive and dangerous for the law­
43 Minutes of the meetings o f the Koolen Committee, 17 March 1934, pp. 6-8, 21 April
1934, pp. 11-12; and Koolen, Verslag van de staatscommissie, pp. 19-20.
44 Minutes of the meetings of the Koolen Committee, 17 March 1934, p. 13; and 
Koolen, Verslag van de staatscommissie, p. 23.
45 Eskes, Repressie, pp. 187-190. Eskes argues that Colijn’s second cabinet did not act 
on the committee’s advice. In doing so, he neglects the fact that the proposals of the 
committee were nevertheless probably welcomed by the government (or at least by 
the confessional ministers) and that they were never completely discarded. That can 
be deduced from statements made by several ministers. See Koolen, Verslag van de 
staatscommissie, p. 6; Colijn, “Wankelen noch weifelen”, pp. 314-315, 319; and 
H TK1934-1935, p. 225.
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ful and healthy development of public institutions and therefore cannot be 
tolerated in an orderly state.46
Colijn had gone even further in his electoral speech in March 1933. 
Parliament was tasked with vocalizing the people’s interests, but should 
not act as “a millstone around the neck of a powerful administration”. 
Only under a strong government “will there be order and discipline in 
addition to an appropriate measure of freedom”.47 Even though the 
cabinet decided not to follow the committee’s advice, in the second half 
of 1934, it did not reject the repression of “revolutionary representa­
tives”. It merely postponed it to a constitutional reform that was sched­
uled for the near future.48
Constitutional Reform and Clashing Conceptions 
of Democracy
Within a year of Colijn’s second cabinet taking office, around the 
time when the Koolen Committee was publishing its report, it started to 
consider amendments to the constitution. The liberal and confessional 
ministers felt that rigorous measures were needed to curb extremism, 
restore order to society, and respond to the criticism levelled at the 
existing democratic system.49 Their determination became even stronger 
in the following years, especially when the national socialists (NSB) 
scored an alarming victory in the provincial elections of 1935, the first 
elections in which the NSB participated. Because radical changes in 
voter preferences were rare in Dutch politics, the establishment was 
shocked. The only reason why the constitution had not immediately 
been revised was that the procedure required new parliamentary elec­
tions, which would not be held until 1937.50
In the course of 1935, the prime minister Hendrik Colijn, minister of 
the interior Jacob A. de Wilde, and minister of justice van Schaik 
discussed a number of possible amendments. At the top of their list 
stood the exclusion of “revolutionary representatives”. The ministers 
copied the advice of Koolen’s committee: representatives who used or 
propagated illegal means to achieve their political goals would perma­
46 Koolen, Verslag van de staatscommissie, p. 6.
47 Colijn, “Wankelen noch weifelen”, pp. 314-315, 319.
48 HTK 1934-1935, p. 225.49 .
Vree, Franciscus P.I.M. van, De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland 1930-1939. Een 
studie over de vorming van de publieke opinie, Groningen, Historische Uitgeverij, 
1989, p. 33.50 The NSB took almost eight per cent of the vote. De Rooy, “Een zoekende tijd”, 
p. 220; and Vossen, Vrij vissen in het Vondelpark, pp. 184-185.
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nently lose their membership o f the legislature. Colijn, de Wilde, and 
van Schaik went even further. In order to prevent radical parties from 
replacing the banned representative with another transgressor, his seat 
should remain vacant for the duration o f the parliamentary term. More­
over, the ministers confirmed that illegal acts and utterances were 
always punishable, regardless o f whether the representative had con­
ducted them in or out o f office.51
Before the proposal was introduced to parliament, it was discussed 
by an advisory committee of legal experts and the leaders of the six 
largest political parties, presided over by ministers de Wilde and van 
Schaik. After vehement debates between January and June 1936, the 
majority of the committee’s members endorsed government proposals 
on how to deal with extremist representatives. At the beginning of 1937, 
the proposals for constitutional reform were discussed in parliament, 
where the exclusion of radical politicians was both criticized and ap­
plauded. Following the elections, the new representatives passed finq] 
judgement on changes to the constitution. Ultimately, the repression of 
“revolutionary representatives” was rejected, because the proponents 
failed to muster the required two-thirds majority.52
During the procedures, the form and limits of democracy became the 
topic of intense debate, both in the De Wilde Committee aid in parlia­
ment. At least three contrasting definitions of democracy clashed with 
each other during the discussions; nor was there even any consensus on 
the questions of whether democracy should be defended against extrem­
ism, and whether the ban on radical politicians could be seen as part of 
that attempt.
That disagreement on the objective of the amendments has been 
overlooked by previous historians, who assumed that the constitutional 
reform had been an “indirect attempt to get the extremist parties under 
control and to force them into a democratic mould”.53 Many committee 
members and parliamentarians did indeed regard the exclusion of 
“revolutionary representatives” as a way of defending democracy. 
Social democrats in particular, along with progressive and conservative
31 Draft of govemment proposals for constitutional reform, V, document 11, NA, 
Archief van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken: Afdeling Binnenlands Bestuur 
(1879-1950) (hereafter, AMBZ) 2.04.57, inv. No. 1009.
52 Oud, Pieter J., Het jongste verleden. Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland, 
1918-1940, Deel V, 1933-1937, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1950, p. 442; and Wilde, J.A. 
de, Verslag van de staatscommissie, ingesteld bij Koninklijk Besluit van 24 januari 
1936, nr. 41, aan welke is opgedragen de voorbereiding van eene partieele her­
ziening van de grondwet, The Hague, 1936, pp. 10-12. This report was published 
8 June 1936.
53 Eskes, Repressie, p. 218.
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liberals, considered democracy to be -  in the words of committee mem­
ber, parliamentarian, and SDAP leader Johan W. Albarda -  an “absolute 
norm” that should be protected against extremists.54 Some Protestant 
parliamentarians seemed to agree, because they argued that the parlia­
mentary system was at stake.55
The government, on the other hand, never mentioned the protection 
of democracy as an objective. Instead, it told parliament that its pro­
posals were meant to maintain law and order.36 Van Schaik even explic­
itly denied that the ban on radical representatives had anything to do 
with the salvation of democracy: “Albarda regards it [the exclusion of 
extremists] as a means to avert anti-democratic dangers. However, the 
proposal of the government is free from all democratic and anti­
democratic blemishes.”57 Only after several parliamentarians had 
wrongly assumed that the government’s plans were meant to safeguard 
democracy was de Wilde forced to declare that the government did wish 
to prevent the demise of the parliamentary system. Nevertheless, he 
adamantly refused to equate that with the protection of democracy: “It 
has become clear that the majority of the members of parliament favours 
the preservation of the parliamentary system. Some have called this the 
defence of democracy; I prefer the term ‘parliamentary system’.”58 The 
minister alluded to a system in which “the legislative work is performed 
by a government in collaboration with parliament”.59 That implies that 
de Wilde regarded the protection of parliament mainly as a means to get 
legislation passed, instead of as a goal in itself. Later in his speech, he 
even made absolutely clear that he did not regard democracy as an 
unassailable ideal. He rejected a social democratic counterproposal to 
outlaw all anti-democrats, by asking rhetorically: “Where would we be, 
if we should use democracy as our only criterion for deciding whether a 
party should be allowed?”60
54
Albarda denoted democracy as an “absolute norm” during a meeting of the commit­
tee. Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, 3, 16. Other 
references to the defence of democracy can be found in parliamentary documents and 
debates. H TK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. l,p . 18, pp. 1408-1409,1414,1420.
55 HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1411, 1427-1428. The Protestant parties that took this view 
were the ARP and the orthodox Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP).
The documents sent by the cabinet to parliament did not contain any references to the 
protection of democracy. HTK 1935-1936, bijlage 477, No. 11, p. 9, and HTK 1935­
1936, bijlage 105, No. 2, pp. 27-29,41-43.
Minutes o f the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, p. 13.
SS HTK 1936-1937, p. 1430.
59 Ibid.
60
HTK 1936-1937, p. 1432.
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The debates on the exclusion of “revolutionaiy representatives” con­
firmed the assumption of the Koolen Committee that not everyone was 
convinced of the democratic acceptability of the measure. Though 
theoretically willing to take steps to protect democracy, a substantial 
minority of critics on the De Wilde Committee and in parliament were 
convinced that the government proposal would “harm democratic 
thought”.61 Unlike the discussions on the disciplinary powers of the 
chairman of the lower house in 1934, in the present debate the extrem­
ists were not the only ones who rejected the cabinet’s suggestion as 
undemocratic. Their perspective on and definition of parliamentary 
democracy were shared by the social democratic SDAP and even by the 
progressive liberal coalition party VDB.62
Those parties objected to the perceived risk of arbitrariness and the 
“clause concerning the vacant parliamentary seat”. In their view, legal 
instruments for the exclusion of radical politicians could be manipulated 
by the political elite in order to strengthen its position. “This reeks of a 
coup d ’étatV, the social democratic jurist and committee member 
George van den Bergh exclaimed.63 And, critics argued, even if the 
banned representative were really guilty of illegal intentions, the provi­
sion that his parliamentary seat should remain vacant until the next 
election would be detrimental to his party and voters, who might be 
blameless.64
Such complaints were motivated partly by extremist and social dem­
ocrat fears that they themselves might become the targets of the repres­
sive measure, since the authorities suspected them of revolutionary 
intentions. In 1936, the intelligence service assumed that “When social 
democrats make a stand for democracy, as in our country, they of course 
do so because they want to establish socialism through democracy.”65
61 Both the social democrats (SDAP) and progressive liberals (VDB) in parliament 
approvingly cited these words of a Professor of Constitutional Law. H TK1936-1937, 
pp. 1414,1420.
62 Minutes of die meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 3, 16., 18,21; 
HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. 1, p. 19; and HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1409, 1413­
1414,1420,1422-1425.
63 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 17-18. See 
also the following footnote.
64 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 4, 6-7, 9-10, 
16-18, 21-23; see the minority report o f the opponents of the government proposals 
on the De Wilde Committee, in Wilde, Verslag van de staatscommissie, pp. 37-39; 
HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. 1, p. 19; and HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1409-1411, 
1414-1416,1419-1420,1422,1424.
63 Original emphasis. Rapportage van de Centrale Inlichtingendienst, 1919-1940, 
document Overzicht 1936/06, p. 19, <http://www.inghist.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/ 
RapportenCentraleInlichtingendienstl919-1940>.
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That suspicion was unwarranted, because as early as 1933 SDAP lead­
ers had declared that their party had left its revolutionary past behind 
and that “to the SDAP, democracy is not only a principle and a means, 
but also one of its goals”.6* Therefore, the social democrats also fre­
quently objected to the exclusion of “revolutionary representatives” 
because they too felt that the measure “conflicts with the essence of the 
democratic constitutional state”.67
To social democrats and progressive liberals, democracy was a way 
to ensure that the people could influence politics. On the De Wilde 
Committee and in parliament they often referred to the sovereignty of 
the people as democracy’s main ideological pillar. Sometimes responsi­
bility too was mentioned as a democratic foundation, especially by the 
VDB, but it was not emphasized as much as it had been by the Koolen 
Committee. Critics of the cabinet probably downplayed that aspect 
because it reminded them of the government’s line of argument. Other 
frequently mentioned democratic values were legal certainty, freedom 
of political thought, and the exclusion of arbitrariness.68 Because critics 
believed that every political group had the right to be represented, the 
core element of their form of democracy was a parliament that should 
“reflect the political views of the people”.69 As a result, even extremists 
were entitled to seats in parliament. Their admittance had the additional 
advantage, it was argued, of its being a democratic “safety valve” which 
would prevent radicalization.™ Social democrats and progressive liber­
als were confident that democracy was capable of protecting itself 
against subversive elements, since the people kept a watchful eye on its 
politicians. Parliamentary democracy had no need nor place for any 
other defence mechanisms: “Democracy has stronger weapons than
66 See the report of the “Herzieningscommissie” of the SDAP (1933), p. 65, cited in 
Knegtmans, Peter J., Socialisme en democratie: de SDAP tussen klasse en natie, 
1929-1939, Amsterdam, Stichting Beheer IISG, 1989, pp. 104, 150-157. See also 
Wijne, Johan S., Tussen dogma en werkelijkheid. De ideologische gijzeling van de 
sociaal-democratie in Nederland als bijdrage tot haar isolement tijdens het interbel­
lum, Amsterdam, Stichting Beheer IISG, 1992, pp. 154-156; and Tromp, Bart 
A.G.M., Het sociaal-democratischprogramma. De beginselprogramma's van SDB, 
SDAP en PvdA, 1878-1977, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2002, pp. 192, 199-201, 220, 
223, 226-228, 505-510.
67 H IK  1936-1937, p. 1414.
68 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 6-7, 17-18;
Wilde, Verslag van de staatscommissie, p, 37; HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. 1,
p. 19; and HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1413-1415, 1419-1420, 1422,1424-1425. rfïü _
Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 21-23. See
also HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. 1, p. 19.
50 HTK 1936-1937, pp, 1415-1416. See also Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde
Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 16, 21-23.
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clever and vague legal constructions. The strongest weapons of democ­
racy are transparency and freedom of speech.”71
Although most conservative liberal, Protestant, and Catholic advo­
cates of the exclusion of “revolutionary representatives” did not feel that 
they were defending democracy, they were not prepared to acknowledge 
that they were endangering democracy either. Now that the charge was 
supported by larger parties, including one of the parties in government, 
they could not ignore the allegation, as they had done in 1934, so they 
contended, in the De Wilde Committee, in parliament, and in cabinet, 
that actually their proposals were very democratic. In doing so, they 
defended a conception of democracy that differed significantly from 
their critics’ ideas of parliamentary democracy.
The proponents of the amendments agreed with their adversaries that 
democracy was a means to guarantee the people’s involvement in 
politics and policymaking. Both groups regarded the sovereignty of the 
people as a cornerstone of the democratic system. However, in the eyes 
of die government and its supporters, democracy also relied on the 
dignified and responsible behaviour of both politicians and citizens. 
Reint H. de Vos van Steenwijk, a conservative liberal member of the De 
Wilde Committee, summarized their view: “according to democratic 
thought, every party should be able to express its principles, provided 
that it does so in a legal way”.72 That assertion was accompanied by a 
view on the role of parliament which deviated from the social democrat­
ic and progressive liberal perspective. In the words of Anne Anema, a 
Protestant jurist, committee member, and senator: “parliament is no 
longer merely a representation of the people, but is also a constructive 
element in our form of government”.73 By stressing that there was no 
scope within democracy for irresponsible and destructive criticism, the 
advocates of the government’s plans justified their claim that it was 
democratic to repress the use and support of illegal means of political 
struggle. Anema continued: “Therefore, not all political groups are 
entitled to a seat in parliament, as van den Bergh has suggested, but 
only those groups that are willing to conduct constructive tasks. Groups
71 HTK 1936-1937, p. 1414. See also pp. 1411, 1419, 1427; HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 
105, No. 1, p. 19, and Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 
1936, p. 4.
72 Minutes o f the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, p. 6. See also 
Wilde, Verslag van de staatscommissie, pp. 10-11; HTK 1935-1936, bijlage 477. 
No. 11, p. 9; and flTA: 1936-1937, p. 1430.
73 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 10-15. See 
also HTK 1936-1937, p. 1430.
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that refuse to do so do not belong in parliament.”74 The risk that their 
exclusion and their seat being declared vacant as a result would hurt 
citizens was also deemed justifiable in a democracy. To van Schaik it 
vvas clear that “if a group o f  voters abuses its power, it is legitimate to 
correct that abuse”.75 Evidently, the government and its conservative 
liberal, Protestant, and Catholic supporters did not adhere to the parlia­
mentary democracy of their critics, but embraced the same repertoire of 
disciplined democracy as the Koolen Committee and Colijn’s second 
cabinet had done.
Parliamentary democracy and disciplined democracy were not the 
only two repertoires that clashed in the discussions on the reform of the 
constitution. A third repertoire of democracy entered into public debate 
in September 1936, when the social democrat van den Bergh proposed 
an alternative way to curb extremism. In his inaugural speech as Profes­
sor of Constitutional Law, he claimed that democracy had the right to 
prohibit parties that aimed at its destruction. In contrast to the govern­
ment's plans, he suggested that political organizations should be banned 
because of their anti-democratic principles, even if they restricted 
themselves to legal means to implement those principles.76 That sugges­
tion had already been briefly discussed several months earlier in the 
De Wilde Committee, when Albarda had launched a similar proposal. 
Van den Bergh’s plan aroused controversy during the parliamentary 
debates on constitutional reform in 1937.77
During those debates, both the desirability and the democratic nature 
of the prohibition of anti-democrats were discussed. Van den Bergh felt 
that party bans based on ideology were acceptable in a democratic state, 
but realized that not everyone would agree. By claiming that “democra­
cy is allowed to adopt the weapons of dictatorship for one single goal: 
defence against dictatorship”, he admitted that his proposal added a new 
element to the current repertoire of democracy.78 Furthermore, van den 
Bergh’s argument shows that his idea of democracy had an ideological
74 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp, 13-15, 18. 
See also HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1408-1409, 1411-1412, 1419, 1427-1428, 1430-1431 
(original emphasis).
75 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 10-13, 23. 
See also Wilde, Verslag van de staatscommissie, p. 11 ; HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, 
No. 2, p. 41; and HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1408-1409,1432.
Bergh, George van den, De democratische Staat en de niet-democratische partijen, 
Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 1936.
Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, pp. 3-4, 16-17; 
HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. I, p. 18, and HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1409, 1413­
1414, 1432.
Bergh, De democratische Staat, p. 26.
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foundation different from parliamentary democracy and discipline 
democracy. The social democratic professor acknowledged that, at first 
glance, democracy seemed to be obliged to respect everyone’s freedom 
of thought and legal equality, to be tolerant towards dissenters, and to 
guarantee the people’s influence on policy. And yet, van den Bergh 
argued, that was not the essence of the democratic arrangement. Democ­
racy was obliged to grant those privileges only to citizens who allowed 
others to enjoy the same rights.79 His line of reasoning was based on the 
idea that democracy was an unassailable moral principle, instead of g 
political system aimed at executing the popular will. The two ideologi­
cal pillars of democracy, freedom and equality, were deemed so im­
portant that their adversaries could be denied access to democratic 
privileges: “In this state, where the principles of spiritual freedom Mid 
legal egalitarianism are sacrosanct, all societal and political views 
should be tested against these principles.”80 In practice, that mean! 
equality being partly sacrificed, as Albarda acknowledged in the De 
Wilde Committee: “in a democratic state, democratic and anti­
democratic movements do not deserve equal rights: the democratic 
principle forbids even a majority to violate the democratic rights of the 
people”.81
Van den Bergh’s contemporaries were aware too that his counter­
proposal introduced a new interpretation of democracy. A progressive 
liberal journalist who supported his perspective called it “essential 
democracy”, because it referred to core democratic principles. In an 
effort to convince sceptics of the democratic nature of that view, he 
wrote that “In the past too, terms have changed their meaning over time. 
This is certainly the case with the term ‘democracy’.”82 The SDAP did 
not need to be persuaded. Although the social democrats on the De 
Wilde Committee and in parliament defended parliamentary democracy 
against the exclusion of “revolutionary representatives”, their statements 
also implicitly referred to aspects of essential democracy. For example, 
social democratic parliamentarians argued that “democracy has the 
moral right to protect itself against its enemies” and implied that, in
79 Bergh, De democratische Staat, pp. 7-9, 23-28.
SO *Bergh, De democratische Staat, p. 25 (original emphasis). This idea was elaborates 
two years later by a progressive liberal journalist, Abraham Carel Josephus Jitta, 
Josephus Jitta, Het wezen der democratie, pp. 12, 25-26, 31-32. See also Eskes, 
Repressie, pp. 248, 250-252,254, 258-259.
81 Minutes of the meetings of the De Wilde Committee, 3 April 1936, p. 3.
82 *Josephus Jitta, Het wezen der democratie, pp. 12, 31.
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future, parliamentarians might be willing to stock “the arsenal of de­
mocracy” with precautions against anti-democrats.83
Other commentators rejected van den Bergh’s view of democracy. 
The progressive liberals held on to parliamentary democracy and op­
posed all measures that might endanger the sovereignty of the people. 
They felt that “in our country everyone is and ought to be completely 
free to pursue a form of government and a legal order that deviate from 
the ones in which we currently live”.®4 The most vehement opponent of 
essential democracy was de Wilde. As noted above, he did not share van 
den Bergh’s view that anti-democratic principles should be the criterion 
for repression. That implies that de Wilde did not regard democracy as 
unassailable, although that did not stop him from rejecting Van den 
Bergh’s counterproposal as “very undemocratic”.85 In de Wilde’s view, 
repudiating democracy was “everyone’s right”. All citizens who obeyed 
the law, even anti-democrats, were equally entitled to the democratic 
rights of representation, freedom of expression and thought, and protec­
tion against arbitrariness. Despite the fact that de Wilde and van den 
Bergh both wanted to repress extremism, the minister felt there was a 
fundamental difference between van den Bergh’s essential democracy 
and his own disciplined democracy.86
At the start of the parliamentary debates on constitutional reform in 
October 1936, a number of parliamentarians had predicted that reaching 
agreement would be complicated by the fact that “there is no concrete 
idea, let alone a substantial consensus, on the fundamental constitutional 
changes that are needed to preserve, guarantee, or strengthen the [demo­
cratic character of our form of government]”.87 During the final parlia­
mentary debate on the constitutional reform, early in 1937, that predic­
tion came true. The government’s proposal to exclude “revolutionary 
representatives” fell short of the mandatory two-thirds majority in 
parliament because the extremist, social democratic, and progressive 
liberal parties rejected disciplined democracy.88 Van den Bergh’s party 
bans too foundered as a result of the fundamental disagreement on what 
democracy was and what democracy should be.
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“Striking at the Roots”
The failure to exclude “revolutionary representatives” was a grave 
disappointment to the new government. Despite the fact that the nation, 
al socialists gained far fewer votes than expected in the parliamentar 
elections of 1937, the presence of both right- and left-wing extremis; 
organizations in the public arena instilled fear in Colijn’s confessionai 
cabinet.89 The new minister of justice Carel M.J.F. Goseling therefore 
proposed to “strike at the roots” of the problem.90 The debate about the 
repression of extremism and the limits of democracy continued.
Instead of barring politicians from representative assemblies, whicj- 
had proved to be unfeasible, Goseling suggested banning extremis- 
organizations altogether. Unlike Van den Bergh, Goseling rejected 
preventive checks based on the ideology of a political party. Instead, the 
minister argued that organizations that had disturbed public order (i.e. 
that had broken the law, had offended against common decency, or hac" 
hindered citizens in the exercise of their rights) should be declared 
illegal by the judiciary. Such a law had been included in the Penal Code 
since 1855, but Goseling wanted to widen the scope of its enforcement. 
Both individual members and organizations should be liable to penal­
ties. Furthermore, not only an association’s stated goals but also its acts, 
whether conscious or unintended, should be liable to provoke a ban. The 
minister concluded that police officers should be granted free access to 
public meetings and that foreigners should be barred from Dutch organ­
izations.91
Goseling had harboured these thoughts for years. From November 
1933 to October 1936, he had headed a research committee of the 
Catholic party that studied the desirability of changes to the form of 
government, including a new law on association. After the committee 
had suggested restricting the right of association and assembly, Gose- 
ling repeatedly voiced that opinion in parliament. The government 
refused to consider his proposal as long as the exclusion of “revolution­
ary representatives” was under debate, but as soon as that measure had
89 Colijn’s second cabinet (1933-1935) had fallen in the summer of 1935 and been 
reconstituted as Colijn’s third cabinet (1935-1937). The administration that took of­
fice in June 1937 was Colijn’s fourth cabinet.
90 Goseling, C.M.J.F. et a i, Een onderzoek omtrent wijziging van ons staatsbestel 
Rapport, uitgebracht aan het bestuur der R.K. Staatspartij, door een commissie ui> 
den raad van studie en documentatie dier partij, The Hague, R.K. Staatspartij, 1936 
p. 48.
91 HTK 1937-1938, bijlage 475, No. 3, pp. 2-6, and HTK 1938-1939, bijlage 42
No. 12, pp. 16-18.
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been rejected by parliament and Goseling had become a minister, party 
bans then had a real chance of being codified in law.92
When Goseling introduced his bill in parliament in May 1938, his 
pain argument was that the outdated act of 1855 was inadequate to deal 
wjth the increased importance of political associations. In addition, he 
stated that the “mental confusion” of the 1930s had increased the need 
to revise the law, but he declined to emphasize that motive in order to 
8void the impression that his proposal was an ad hoc measure. Never­
theless, the minister also hinted at a wish to save democracy. He cau­
tiously implied that his proposal was aimed at the protection of the 
people’s liberties against freedom-abusing national socialists.93 In the 
report of his committee, Goseling had even explicitly voiced an ambi­
tion to “restore and purify the appropriate task and function of popular 
representation in the democratic parliamentary state”.94
The Goseling Committee argued that it was democratic to withhold 
freedom of association and assembly from parties that posed a threat to 
the common good: “Even in parliamentary democracy there is room for 
this norm and this criterion.”95 Although the committee members often 
used the term “parliamentary democracy”, they defended a repertoire 
that closely resembled disciplined democracy. In their eyes, democracy 
was a political system that consisted of a parliament and government 
collaborating for the common good. The people decided what was in 
their best interests, but had a duty to pursue also the national interest in 
“organized cooperation” with the authorities. Political organizations 
played a key role in the arrangement, the committee argued: “Political 
parties are the means to effectuate the people’s influence on the state. 
They do so by giving direction to political thoughts and by contributing 
to the composition of the representative body.”96
Two ideological foundations of this democratic system, often men­
tioned by the committee, were the sovereignty of the people aid free­
dom of association and assembly.97 But, according to Goseling, that was 
not all: “Lately, it has become increasingly clear that freedom must be
* Eskes, Repressie, pp. 258-262; HTK 1936-1937, bijlage 105, No. 1, pp. 20-21;
bijlage 105, No. 2, pp. 28,42; HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1418-1419,1434.
” HTK 1937-1938, bijlage 475, No. 3, p. 2, and HTK 1938-1939, bijlage 42, No. 1, 
p. 1.94
Goseling, Een onderzoek, pp. 20, 31, 48.
’ Goseling, Een onderzoek, p. 48.
Goseling, Een onderzoek, pp. 18-20, 31, 33, 39,43,48.
Goseling, Een onderzoek, pp. 33, 39,43,45,48.
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accompanied by an appropriate responsibility.”98 He added that political 
parties were especially obliged to serve the public interest, since the- 
channelled the people’s will. That made it justifiable, in Goseling>'s 
eyes, to ban parties which irresponsibly threatened public order and 
common decency." All in all, Goseling and his committee respected 
individual freedom of thought, but felt that democracy should not grant 
any organization unbridled freedom to disseminate “indecent” beliefs 
To the minister, that was an important principle, since it prohibited 
extremists from endangering the liberties of the general public. In fne 
firm conviction that democratic society should be “both free and order­
ly”, Goseling incited parliament “to relinquish a little freedom, on 
behalf of Freedom”.100
Unsurprisingly, Goseling’s view of democracy sparked a lively de­
bate in February 1939 when his bill was discussed in parliament. The 
SDAP in particular remained unconvinced by the minister’s line of 
reasoning. According to the party’s leader Albarda, repression of free­
dom of association and assembly did not strike at the roots of extrem­
ism, but hacked away “one of the fundamental pillars of democracy”.101 
Once again, the social democrats defended traditional parliamentary 
democracy, although their devotion to democratic ideals also reminds us 
of essential democracy. Above all, Albarda stated, citizens should be 
able to participate freely in the political arena. In that case, it meant the 
inalienable freedom to form political organizations. Albarda’s repertoire 
of democracy left no room for repressive measures, because the risk of 
their arbitrary use might frighten associations into submission. Instead, 
the social democrats relied on democracy’s “inner strength” to defend 
itself against its adversaries.102 Albarda therefore urged his fellow 
parliamentarians “to refrain from the destruction of principal democratic 
institutions”.103
The liberal and Protestant parties felt that the SDAP had overreacted. 
Yet they themselves did not respond enthusiastically to Goseling’s pro­
posal. The LSP, VDB, ARP, and CHU regretted his suggestion to res­
trict freedom, because -  in the words of the progressive liberal Joekes -
98 HTK 1937-1938, bijlage 475, No. 3, pp. 2-3. See also HTK 1938-1939, p. 1325 
(origiriaL emphasis).
w Goseling, Een onderzoek, pp. 43-46, 48, 56; HTK 1936-1937, pp. 1418-1419; Eskes, 
Repressie, p. 262.
100 HTK 1936-1937, p. 1419, and HTK 1938-1939, pp. 1327, 1330, 1335. See also HTK 
1937-1938, bijlage A, 2 , 1, No. 5, p. 42; bijlage 475, No. 3, pp. 2-3; Goseling, Een 
onderzoek, pp. 43-48, 56; Eskes, Repressie, pp. 260-262.
101 HTK 1938-1939, p. 1317.
102 HTK 1938-1939, pp. 1313-1317, 1330-1331.
103 HTK 1938-1939, p. 1317.
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the right of association and meeting was of “major importance to demo­
cratic society”.104 Nevertheless, they did not share Albarda’s conclusion 
that democracy should remain untouchable. On the contrary, in princi­
ple they agreed with the minister that the exceptional situation called for 
drastic measures. Their main argument was that freedom, though im­
portant, should be bound by responsibility. The conservative liberal 
\Villem C. Wendelaar eloquently articulated this basic assumption of 
disciplined democracy:
Liberalism preaches tolerance towards all people with other beliefs, and of 
course we should honour that tolerance, especially with respect to political 
adversaries, regardless of their deviating principles and terminology. But 
there is a limit; yes, there is a point at which I proudly call myself intolerant 
[,..] The circumstances require serious measures and demand that sacred 
cows are not spared, not even my own sacred cows.105
However, agreement on the fact that things had to change did not au­
tomatically entail a uniform view of how far the changes should go. 
Despite their concurrence on the principles of disciplined democracy 
and shared relief that the minister had rejected preventive checks by 
arbitrary authorities, the liberals and Protestants differed in their opin­
ions about the question of whether Goseling’s party bans should be 
added to the repertoire of disciplined democracy. In the end, the conser­
vative and progressive liberals decided that the government’s proposal 
went too far on some accounts and voted against it. The Protestants, on 
the other hand, reluctantly supported the bill as an unavoidable emer­
gency measure. Since the Catholics too backed their minister, the 
proposal was passed by a small majority.106
With approval having been gained in May 1939 for Goseling’s pro­
posal that the government should be able to ban parties, the attempts to 
exclude extremist politicians and parties permanently from political life 
that had been made since 1934 were finally translated into legislation. 
Nevertheless, the victory for the advocates of such strict measures did 
not last long. Goseling’s law was rarely enforced Mid the authorities 
took hardly any new steps against extremism. A substantial proportion 
of MPs still clamoured for more repressive measures, especially now 
that radicalism within the Netherlands might be exacerbated by mount­
ing international tensions Mid might threaten the neutrality of the Neth­
1Q4
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105 HTK 1938-1939, p. 1319. The other liberals and Protestants wholeheartedly agreed 
with Wendelaar. See tfTX 1938-1939, pp. 1303, 1317-1320, 1322, 1324, 1331-1332, 
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106 HTK 1938-1939, pp. 1310, 1317-1320, 1322-1324, 1367. The bill was approved by 
50 votes to 38.
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erlands. Colijn’s cabinet might have been willing to answer those calls 
but it fell just a month after Goseling's law was enacted.197 By contrast 
its centre-left successor, which consisted of Catholics, Protestants, pro­
gressive liberals, and social democrats, hesitated to restrict the people’? 
liberties. The prime minister Dirk de Geer declared that he would reson 
to further repression only “in the utmost emergency”,108 and it was not 
until three weeks before the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 
1940 that the cabinet proclaimed martial law for the entire country; evem 
then, it barely used its new disciplinary powers. The government feared 
that firm measures might jeopardize the harmony within its own ranks 
and within Dutch society, and realized that the repression of extremism 
was a hotly disputed issue, capable of arousing widely divergent views 
concerning the limits and forms of democracy.109
Conclusion
In 1983 the historian Hermann W. von der Dunk argued that the sta­
bility of the Dutch political system in the 1930s had mainly been the 
result of a lack of consensus within the national elite as to what were the 
crucial flaws and most desirable reforms of the existing parliamentary 
democracy. He argued that all political parties were dissatisfied with the 
form of government as it then was and defended it against extremists 
only because they could not agree on an alternative polity.110
The case study presented here both confirms and complements Von 
der Dunk's hypothesis. The fight against political extremism should not 
be seen solely as a conservative defence of parliamentary democracy, as 
Von der Dunk has suggested, but also as an effort to reform the demo­
cratic system quite radically. Nevertheless, attempts to introduce repres­
sive measures into a democratic system often failed because participants 
in the debates did indeed fundamentally disagree on what democracy 
was and what it should be. Their concepts of democracy diverged to 
such an extent that compromises were virtually impossible to reach. 
Moreover, Von der Dunk has rightly noted that criticism of democracy 
varied widely. For example, complaints about the poor performance of 
representative institutions contradicted the criticism that parliament had 
grown too strong and hindered effective government.
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The disagreement about the nature of democracy was even more pro­
found than Von der Dunk assumed. To begin with, not all advocates of 
the repression of extremism styled themselves saviours of democracy. 
Social democrats and liberals often talked about the need to protect the 
democratic system, but many confessional initiators of repressive 
measures mentioned the preservation of law aid order as their main goal 
instead. A well-ordered society was their first priority, while the protec­
tion of democracy was a means to that end or an added advantage. 
Apparently, not everyone regarded democracy as an unassailable ideal 
that had to be defended at all costs.
More importantly, the participants in the debates on repressive 
measures interpreted democracy in completely different ways. Not only 
did they pursue contrasting political ideals, as Von der Dunk has stated, 
they disagreed also on the practical limits to the democratic system. At 
least three conflicting repertoires of democracy can be discerned. The 
traditional parliamentary democracy was seen as an arrangement to 
ensure that the sovereign will of the people was effected. The most 
important means to that end was a critical, independent, and dignified 
parliament that represented all political beliefs in society. In addition, 
parliamentary democracy consisted of freedom of association, speech, 
and political thought, and safeguards against arbitrariness. The only 
acceptable defence mechanism against radical politicians was public 
accountability. The social democrats, who gradually distanced them­
selves from their revolutionary past in the course of the 1930s, were the 
most vocal advocates of that repertoire of democracy. They were often 
joined by progressive liberals, although they sometimes showed sympa­
thy for a more disciplined form of democracy. The left-wing and right- 
wing extremists also defined democracy as parliamentary rule, although 
without supporting it.
As the threat from extremism increased in the 1930s, disciplined 
democracy garnered more support than parliamentary democracy. Alt­
hough Loewenstein’s term “disciplined democracy” was not used in the 
Netherlands, the label characterizes a liberal, Protestant, and Catholic 
view of democracy rooted in the traditional parliamentary form of 
government, but which also developed new elements in response to the 
extremist menace. Like parliamentary democracy, disciplined democra­
cy denoted a political system aimed at the implementation of the popu­
lar will and was based on the sovereignty of the people. However, the 
addition of responsibility as an ideological foundation had far-reaching 
consequences for politicians Mid citizens alike. Parliament retained its 
right to criticize the cabinet, but also gained the duty to contribute to the 
execution of government policy. It became primarily a legislative body, 
instead of a representative organ. Voters, in turn, were required to put
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the national interest before their individual preferences. Allhough 
citizens could still freely control their rulers, the authorities also objec­
tively saw to it that the freedom o f citizens and their representatives was 
tempered by responsibility. That therefore made repressive measures 
such as the permanent exclusion o f “revolutionary representatives” and 
the restriction of the freedom of association and assembly, democratic.
Essential democracy also entailed party bans, which led Loewenstein 
to the incorrect belief that van den Bergh and his mainly social demo­
cratic supporters adhered to disciplined democracy.111 However, Dutch 
commentators have emphasized the ideological and practical differences 
between disciplined and essential democracy. Instead of a political 
system, the latter conception regarded democracy as a moral principle, 
based on freedom and -  to a lesser extent -  equality. In their view' 
democracy was an absolute norm that had to be defended against its 
enemies. As a result, the grounds on which a party could be banned 
differed too. Whereas disciplined democracy outlawed organizations 
because of their irresponsibility, essential democracy banished parties 
based on their anti-democratic beliefs. In other words, disciplined 
democracy repressed the liberties of all citizens while essential democ­
racy pre-emptively sacrificed the right of anti-democrats to equal treat­
ment in order to protect freedom.
During the discussions about the repression of extremist politicians 
and parties, those three repertoires of democracy frequently clashed. 
Sometimes the differences between the perspectives were gradual. For 
example, disciplined democracy was developed from parliamentary 
democracy and some commentators (notably progressive liberals) 
hovered between the two. Moreover, the repertoires of disciplined 
democracy and essential democracy both contained the element of party 
bans, despite their dissimilar ideological backgrounds and practical 
differences. In most cases, however, conceptions of democracy con­
trasted markedly. Considering the vehemence with which the debaters 
defended their definition of democracy and attacked other repertoires, it 
is likely that each group was convinced that it adhered to the true form 
of democracy. Clearly, Dutch interwar politics were characterized by 
contrasting genuine interpretations of democracy.
Of course, the conflicts between various repertoires of democracy 
were also partly rhetorical. Labelling a political opponent as undemo­
cratic was an effective way of discrediting him and his proposals, which 
suggests that not all references to the “true character of democracy” 
were heartfelt. However, that does not make them less interesting. On 
the contrary, the fact that accusing someone of undemocratic behaviour
111 Loewenstein, “Legislative Control. Part I”, p. 617.
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yyas a viable political strategy sheds more light on the appreciation of 
democracy as a political ideal. Apparently, most Dutch interwar politi­
cians attached enough value to democracy to use it as an argument for 
or against certain policies and to categorically deny that they themselves 
^ere undemocratic. In the 1930s, democracy was not deemed unassaila­
ble, but neither was it seen as irrelevant. It could be criticized, adapted, 
and even rejected, but not ignored.
This case study has demonstrated not only the Dutch appreciation 
and interpretation of democracy in the interwar period, but also shows 
that the traditional view of the “crisis of democracy” needs to be modi­
fied. The point is not that there was no crisis at all. Democracy was 
indeed forced into a defensive position aid many contemporaries expe­
rienced the strain on the democratic system as an urgent problem. 
However, the crisis was a lot more complicated than the traditional idea 
of a uniform dichotomous struggle between fierce anti-democrats and 
staunch defenders of democracy. Democracy experienced a crisis during 
the interwar period in the sense that it had reached a critical stage, 
where it was confronted with both destructive attacks and creative 
attempts at reform.
There was no single crisis of democracy, because critics were divid­
ed on the flaws of the democratic system. Even de Jonge’s distinction 
between the principal rejection of democracy (the “major crisis”) and 
complaints about the practical shortcomings of the democratic system 
(the “minor crisis”) does not capture the pluriform nature of the critique 
that democracy endured, nor did the politicians who shielded democracy 
from its own flaws and extremist attacks form a unified camp. They 
could not agree whether the democratic ideal deserved a principled 
defence. Most importantly, the division between critics and defenders of 
democracy was blurred. Critical commentators could support democracy 
in principle in one form or another, while the defence of one variety of 
democracy might go hand in hand with the rejection of another reper­
toire. Because politicians and jurists used contrasting definitions of 
democracy, they could not reach a consensus on the dividing line be­
tween advocates and opponents of the democratic system. If historians 
insist on creating a dichotomy between democracy’s champions and its 
enemies based on their own anachronistic definition, they will ignore 
the overlap between groups where people tried to redefine democracy. 
The idea that criticism equals crisis in its traditional, destructive sense 
corresponds with die post-Second-World-War notion that democracy is 
unassailable, but does not chime with interwar conceptions of democra­
cy.
In the 1920s and 1930s, democracy managed not only to cope with 
the threat of an existential crisis, but also with an identity crisis. Both
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the value and content of democracy were disputed. Many people con­
sciously and imaginatively sought ways to adapt the democratic system, 
and their active search for the redefinition of a contested concept makes 
the interwar period a good example of a “creative crisis of democracy”. 
Although the focal term for this volume is just as much a scholarly 
construction as the traditional historiographic distinction between anti­
democrats and democrats, it at least shows consideration for the differ­
ing perceptions of democracy among historical actors. The amalgam of 
varying criticism and resourceful renewal of democracy, which proba­
bly characterized many European polities, merits more attention. By 
studying this neglected aspect of the struggle within democracy, schol­
ars will achieve a better understanding of the malleable and sustainable 
nature of the concept, and the complexity of democratic politics in the 
interwar years.
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